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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Carl D. Patterson appeals, pro se, from the district court's summary dismissal of
his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
According to the Idaho Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in Patterson's
direct appeal, the underlying facts of Patterson's convictions are as follows:
Patterson was charged with seventeen counts of lewd conduct with
a child under sixteen years and two counts of sexual battery, one against
a child under sixteen and another against a child under seventeen. These
charges stemmed from allegations that he molested his three
stepdaughters, C.S., S.S., and G.V., from 1996 to 2005. As part of a plea
agreement, Patterson pied guilty to two counts of lewd conduct with a
child under sixteen years, one in 1997 against C.S[.] and one in 2002
against S.S.
State v. Patterson, Docket No. 35661, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 318, p.1 (Idaho
App. January 22, 2010). Patterson was sentenced to a unified term of twenty years with
five years determinate on each count to be served concurrently.

kl

Patterson

appealed, "contending that the district court improperly considered evidence of
misconduct at sentencing unrelated to the charges to which he pied guilty and that the
district court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing an excessive sentence," id.,
p.2, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, id., p.5.
Patterson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by advising Patterson that, if he pied guilty to two
felonies, he would either be sentenced to a retained jurisdiction (rider) or placed on
probation. (R., p.7.) The state filed an answer which included a motion for summary
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dismissal (R., pp.10-18) and the district court filed a "Notice of the Court's Intent to
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' (R., pp.19-22). Patterson, through counsel,
filed an objection to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.23-24.) The
district court filed a "Second Notice of the Court's Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post
Conviction Relief" (R., pp.25-27), explaining that Patterson had "waived his right to file
for Post Conviction Relief in his plea agreement" (id., p. 25). Patterson filed a response
to that notice, arguing that he could not legally waive his right to assert an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.28-29.) The district court entered a "Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction Relief' (R., pp.30-39), ruling
that Patterson had "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to pursue
post-conviction relief' (R., p.35). The court further held that, even if Patterson did not
waive his right to pursue post-conviction relief, he nonetheless failed to present a
genuine issue of material fact to show, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. (R., pp.35-37.)
The district court entered a "Judgment of Dismissal," dismissing Patterson's postconviction petition with prejudice (R., pp.40-41 ), and Patterson timely appealed (R.,
pp.42-44).

2

ISSUES

Patterson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Is [sic] the plea agreement conditions binding as to force appellant to
forfeit or waive his constitutional right to challenge his right to effective
assistance of trial counsel?

2.

Was trial counsel ineffective for advising the appellant to plead guilty to a
specific reduced sentence?

(Appellant's Brief, p.1 (capitalization modified).)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Patterson failed to establish that the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief?

3

ARGUMENT
Patterson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred When It Summarily
Dismissed His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Patterson contends the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post-

conviction relief.

Patterson argues that the district court erred by ruling:

(1) his plea

agreement waived his right to file a post-conviction petition, and (2) even if Patterson's
"ineffectiveness" claim was not waived, he failed to demonstrate trial counsel's
performance was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.
Contrary to Patterson's arguments, the district court correctly ruled that, even if
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not waived under the terms of his plea
agreement, he failed to show his trial counsel's recommendation that he accept the
terms of the plea offer was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 1

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's application of

the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190,
30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ).

On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction

petition, the appellate court freely reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of
material fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant
to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221
1

The state opts to not address Patterson's first issue (waiver by the plea agreement)
inasmuch as the district court's decision on the merits is exceptionally creditable. See
also Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9 th Cir. 2005) ("We therefore hold that a
plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim that challenges the
voluntariness of the waiver.").
4

(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999);
Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164
P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an

ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at
522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal
knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.

!sh (citing

I.C. §

19-4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application must
be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau
v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho
681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative.

"To

withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278,
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 195

4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each
element of petitioner's claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C.
§ 19-4906 (b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must

accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802
(citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001)). If the alleged
facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required
to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition.

~

(citing Stuart v.

State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved
by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."
Id.

D.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-

conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.

The petitioner must demonstrate: 1)

counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. A reviewing court evaluates
counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes
that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal
strategy."

State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997).
6

Counsel's strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the
UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles
v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunningham v. State, 117
Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P .2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990).

"The constitutional

requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have
been tried better." Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).

E.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Patterson's Post-Conviction Petition
The district court ruled that, "even had Patterson not waived his right to pursue a

claim for post-conviction relief, Patterson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are subject to summary dismissal." (R., p.35.) On appeal, Patterson contends:
In the instant case appellant has brought forth the claim that in fact his
attorney did promise him he would receive either aa [sicJ Ryder [sic] or
probation if he accepted a guilty plea. 121 It was not within the scope of the
courts [sic] authority to dismiss this claim without conclusive evidence that
the claim was without merit. This could of [sic] only been resolved by
holding a [sic] evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual dispute that
existed with this claim.
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
In its "Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petition for Post Conviction
Relief," the district court acknowledged the standards for ineffective assistance of

2

In his post-conviction petition, Patterson alleged that his trial counsel "told me to plead
guilty to 2 felonies and I would get a rider or probation." (R., p.7.)
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counsel claims under Strickland (R., pp.35-36) and applied the relevant case law to
Patterson's claim, explaining:
Idaho case law is clear that an attorney's assurance or
representation concerning the sentence cannot provide the basis for postconviction relief. This issue was addressed in Pierce v. State, 124 Idaho
406, 860 P.2d 22 (1993) (Pierce). In Pierce the same issue was asserted
in support of a claim of post-conviction relief. Although the issue came up
in a slightly different context this Court believes the result is the same. In
Pierce, rather than claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner claimed that his guilty plea was coerced because his attorney
had given him an assurance "that a guilty plea could result in no more
than a ten year sentence." Id. at 407. In addressing this issue the Idaho
Supreme Court stated as follows:
With respect to Pierce's claim that his plea of guilty was
"coerced" because of a representation by his attorney about
the sentence Pierce would receive, the district court
explained:
Finally, Pierce claims that he was "coerced"
into entering his guilty plea. Once again, this
claim is supported only by Pierce's allegation.
The alleged coercion was the assurance of
Pierce's counsel that a guilty plea could result
in no more than a ten year sentence. Such an
alleged assurance of leniency made solely by
the defendant's own counsel does not
constitute grounds for post-conviction relief.
In support of this holding, the court again cited to Walker [v.
State, 92 Idaho 517, 446 P.2d 886 (1968)]. In Walker, the
petition alleged that Walker's attorney had told him he would
receive a lesser sentence than ultimately was imposed.
Walker's appeal centered on his claim that he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The Supreme Court
rejected that contention, holding that the misrepresentation
by counsel as to the sentence which Walker would receive
did not "constitute grounds for post-conviction relief." 92
Idaho at 521,446 P.2d at 890.
Again, on this appeal, Pierce counters the district
court's holding by requesting that Walker be overruled. We
will not do so. We uphold the district court's dismissal of the
alleged claim.
8

124 Idaho at 407. See also Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d
123, 126 (Ct. App[.] 2009) (a good faith assurance of leniency or a mere
prediction by a defense counsel to a defendant of the sentence anticipated
is no grounds for post conviction relief although the sentence imposed is
greater than predicted). This Court concludes that the fact that Patterson
asserts that his counsel made representations concerning the forthcoming
sentence does not demonstrate that his performance was deficient in any
manner.
(R., pp.36-37.)
The district court's analysis in rejecting Patterson's claim that his trial attorney
provided deficient performance by allegedly telling Patterson he would be sentenced to
either a rider or probation is sound. The district court accurately determined that an
incorrect prediction of a sentence does not state a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

In Walker, relied upon by the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court

succinctly stated:

'The alleged assurance of leniency was made solely and only by

appellant's appointed counsel.

This does not constitute grounds for post-conviction

relief." 92 Idaho at 521, 446 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as there is no
practical difference between an assurance of leniency (as in Walker) and Patterson's
claim that his trial attorney told him he "would get a rider or probation" (R., p.7),
Walker's holding that such a claim does not warrant post-conviction relief applies to
Patterson's claim. See Bjorklund v. State, 130 Idaho 373, 376, 941 P.2d 345, 348 (Ct.
App. 1997) ("counsel's incorrect predictions about a possible sentence or action by the
court does not amount to ineffective assistance, and, ... , does not render a guilty plea
involuntary."); see also Russell v. State, 105 Idaho 497, 500, 670 P.2d 904, 907 (Ct.
App. 1983). Patterson's claim that he entered his guilty pleas upon representations of
counsel that he would get either a rider or probation fails to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel as a matter of law.
9

The district court also found that Patterson's plea colloquy reasonably informed
him that any representations made by trial counsel in regard to what sentence he would
receive was not determinative of his actual sentence, stating:
Further, even if such a representation was made by Patterson's trial
counsel, the colloquy between the Curt and Patterson at the time of his
change of plea hearing should have adequately apprised Patterson that
neither Patterson's attorney nor any recommendations of the State were
controlling upon the sentencing judge. Despite this dialogue with the
Court, Patterson knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea of
guilty.
(R., p.37; see Exhibit, recording of 5/13/2008 Change of Plea Hearing, 14:45 - 15:30
(plea colloquy showing: (a) no other promises were made to Patterson regarding any
special sentence, favorable treatment, or leniency, (b) Patterson was made aware that
the judge was not required to follow recommendations of counsel and was the only one
who could promise what his sentence would be, and (c) Patterson understood his
sentence might be different than what he expected, and if so, he had no right to
withdraw his guilty pleas based on that fact); 22:35 - 23:10 (Patterson said he had no
concerns, issues or questions about his guilty plea)).

The record shows Patterson

completely understood that the court could impose any sentence it thought appropriate
within the statutory maximum.
The plea colloquy shows that Patterson could not have reasonably relied upon
his trial counsel's (alleged) representation about what his sentence would be when he
pied guilty.

Even without considering the plea colloquy, such representation by trial

counsel udoes not constitute grounds for post-conviction relief." Walker, 92 Idaho at
521, 446 P .2d at 890.

Patterson has failed to demonstrate any error in the district
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court's determination that he failed to present a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether trial counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland.
Moreover, the district court correctly determined "Patterson provides no grounds
indicating how his counsel's allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him." (R., p.37.)
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "to
satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and
citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances."

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485

(2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). As indicated by the district
court, Patterson failed to allege in his post-conviction petition that, absent counsel's
deficient performance, he would not have pied guilty, but would have gone to trial
instead. (See R., pp.6-9.) Further, Patterson failed to allege, much less demonstrate,
that a decision to reject the plea agreement would have been rational, especially
considering that he faced 19 felony charges and a sentence of up to fixed life.
Patterson has failed to show the district court erred in holding that his post-conviction
petition provided "no grounds indicating how his counsel's allegedly deficient
performance prejudiced him." (R., p.37.)
In sum, Patterson has failed to show any error in the district court's determination
that he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating his trial counsel's performance was
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both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. Therefore, the dismissal of his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel was proper.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Patterson's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2012

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of June, 2012, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Carl D. Patterson, #89652
ICC P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
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